Objective: To estimate the relationship between a hospital data breach and hospital quality outcome Materials and Methods: Hospital data breaches reported to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services breach portal and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse database were merged with the Medicare Hospital Compare data to assemble a panel of non-federal acutecare inpatient hospitals for years 2011 to 2015. The study panel included 2,619 hospitals. Changes in 30-day AMI mortality rate following a hospital data breach were estimated using a multivariate regression model based on a difference-in-differences approach.
Introduction
Health data breaches in recent years have raised serious concerns about the security of protected health information. Wide adoption of electronic health record systems (EHRs) following the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 has digitized vast stores of patient data, increasing the possibility of large-scale hacks and inadvertent losses. Demand for health data in the black market makes hospitals a lucrative target for external attackers. [1, 2] Internal vulnerabilities in hospital information systems may be exploited by the external attackers or insiders who may inappropriately disclose data. Health data breaches include loss, theft, unauthorized access, and hacking incidents, which may be associated with error or negligence by hospital staff handling the data. Breaches arise from many different sources, but regardless of the source the resulting discovery and mitigation of a breach can be viewed as a random shock to a hospital's care-delivery system. While agents affiliated with a hospital may benefit from intentionally leaking information (e.g. hospital staff selling patient data to a third party for personal gains), agents (and the hospital itself) face criminal indictment, fines, and business losses from intentional or negligent breaches, [3] which disincentivize intentional breaches. Thus a hospital data breach can be framed as a natural experiment to estimate the impact of a breach on patient outcomes.
Hospital data breaches provide a unique opportunity to study how information problems affect patient outcomes. Subsequent to a breach, organizations typically take action to mitigate the failure and improve security. Such actions can be far ranging, from adopting new policies and procedures to installing new security technologies. Taking advantage of financial incentives provided by of HITECH, many hospitals have made investments in more secure health information technology (HIT), replacing or enhancing modules of their EHRs.
New systems often support security features such as stronger authentication procedures and time-outs for inactivity. Data handling policies typically change as well to control which users have the privilege to see particular patients or specific data fields. All of these actions require hospital staff to acclimate to new systems, learn new procedures, and adjust to new ways of obtaining and manipulating patient data.
In extreme cases, hospital data breaches can also negatively affect the accuracy and timeliness of patient information available to providers. A hacking incident may temporarily disrupt hospital's servers, making patient data unavailable to providers while the servers are being fixed. Severe hacking attacks may force hospitals to revert to paper charts. [4, 5] . Instances of unauthorized access suggests that the systems in place may have weaknesses in verifying the identity of the provider or the patient, which may increase the risk of a provider inadvertently accessing or editing the wrong patient's information. Inaccuracies or delays in patient information are likely to disrupt the care process and adversely affect patient outcomes.
Information problems can ripple through the continuum of care when a patient is transferred from one provider to another, in a handoff. [6] The literature on discontinuity of care has documented the association between miscommunication during handoffs and adverse patient events. [7] [8] [9] A hospital data breach and subsequent mitigation activities may disrupt the information flow or the processes involved in handoffs, therefore leading to adverse patient outcomes.
Furthermore, efforts to fix the damages from a data breach may divert resources and attention away from initiatives focused on patient care, like improved patient safety or medication adherence. Breached hospitals incur significant costs associated with investigating and fixing the breach. The Ponemon Institute estimated that in 2016 the health care industry spent an average of $355 per stolen record for direct and indirect costs associated with a breach. [10] Breach costs vary depending on the size and type of the breach. Large breaches place a larger financial burden on the organization. Typical data breaches of 500 patients cost hospitals about $200,000 on average, including costs from investigating the breach, notifying the affected individuals, public relations, credit monitoring, litigation, and fines.
[11] Large breaches cost much more -an analysis of press releases by the HHS since 2008 documented 40 settled cases with the median settlement amount of $857,750 for the fine alone. [12] The aim of our paper is to estimate the impact of a data breach on the 30-day mortality rate using a difference-in-differences approach to analyze a panel of non-federal acute-care inpatient hospitals from 2011-2015. We hypothesized that remedial activities following a breach may delay and disrupt the patient care. There may be an initial breach effect: hacking incidents can shutdown IT systems and disrupt care, which we see in ransomware attacks, but these were rare before to 2016. Theft, unauthorized access by insiders, lost devices are unlikely to have a direct effect. However, new access and authentication procedures, new protocols, new software after any breach incident is likely to disrupt clinicians.
Background

Breach Regulation
As part of the HITECH Act, health care providers, health plans, and other entities covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to are required to notify the affected individuals, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and sometimes the media following a breach of unsecured protected health information. [13] HHS maintains a public database of the reported breaches affecting 500 or more individuals, submitted from October 2009 to the present. [14] HHS defines a data breach as impermissible use or disclosure of protected health information. [13] HHS classifies data breaches into the following categories: theft, loss, unauthorized access/disclosure, improper disposal, hacking/IT incident, and unknown/other. A specific definition of each category is not given on the HHS website and questions can be raised whether these categories can be conceptually isolated and subjectively defined. The boundary between theft and loss may be unclear when a laptop goes missing. In a hospital, monitoring and enforcing which provider is authorized to access which patient information at what time is not a trivial task. Peeking is a widespread problem, which if detected is now considered a breach. Hacking is a broad term for computer intrusion by an outside party and it can be done by various techniques. To add to the complexity, these categories are not mutually exclusive as a breach event involves a combination of these categories. Consequently, the number of individuals affected by the breach is often an estimate and precise numbers should be viewed with skepticism. An individual may be double counted if affected by a hacking incident that attacks multiple systems.
Collections of reported breaches, like those on the HHS website and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, do not represent all breaches. To end up on these public databases, a breach must be (1) detected by the entity and (2) disclosed in some way. As defined by HHS, breaches must be publicly reported if they affect 500 or more individuals. However, HHS allows exemptions if the breached data satisfy the HIPAA safe harbor method for encryption. [15] The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reports breaches of any size disclosed by the organization or the media.
Methods
Data
Our analysis included breaches reported to the HHS and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) database between 2011 and 2015. Similar to the HHS database, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) aggregates reported breaches from public sources including the media, blogs, and government. [16] Both data sources provide information on the name of the breached entity, when the breach report was filed, location of the breached entity, type of breached entity, type of breach, and specific comments regarding the breach. The databases only provide the name of the breached entity; they do not provide standardized identifiers to facilitate linkages with other data. To overcome these limitations, observations in the breach databases were linked by hospital name and state, however the potential for erroneous matches remains.
Breaches were more frequently reported from states with larger populations. Due to state variations in breach notification laws and how they are enforced, some states may be over represented. Before HITECH, California was one of the first states to enact a breach notification law, which became effective on July 1, 2003, and most states have followed its language. [17] Yet as of January 4, 2016, Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota do not have a breach notification law. [18] The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provide public use data on Medicare- The raw data panel consisted of 6,435 hospitals with 30,384 hospital-year observations. Data were restricted to non-federal acute-care inpatient hospitals. Hospitals in the U.S territories and Maryland (which has a prospective payment system waiver) were excluded for consistency.
To maintain consistency in the financial data, the data were further restricted to hospitals that filed HCRIS with between 360 and 370 reporting days. When a hospital submitted multiple reports in a given year, the most recent report was used. The restrictions yielded 3,369 acute-care hospitals with 15,517 observations. Finally, observations with missing values in the dependent or independent variables were dropped from analysis. 3,932 observations were missing the 30-day AMI mortality rate, accounting for most of the missing values. The final study panel consisted of 2,619 hospitals with 11,568 hospital-year observations.
Generalized Difference in Difference Model
The association between breaches and hospital outcomes was estimated using a generalized difference-in-differences (DID) framework with multiple pre-and post-periods. [21] Data breaches represent random shocks reported in a specific year, though susceptible to measurement error from the actual year of breach. Panel data provide pre-and post-breach measures of patient outcomes. The DID strategy controls for time trends in outcomes among the breached hospitals, assuming that the breached hospitals would have followed the same trend if they had not been breached, to isolate the change in outcomes associated with the breach.
The DID model was specified as the following equation. For hospital i at time t=2011. . . 2015, Y is the 30-day mortality rate (%) in Medicare Hospital Compare, [22] adjusted for patient characteristics to allow comparisons between hospitals. The risk adjusted mortality rates are model based estimates and they have uncertainty around them, which we ignore in our analysis. The mortality rates are based on a 36-month moving average, starting from the current year and moving back 36 months; hence a lagged response to a breach is expected. This is a limitation set by the data provider. Hospital Compare data reports mortality and readmission rates for AMI, heart failure, and pneumonia. AMI, pneumonia, and heart failure are common conditions. Past studies have found that the adoption of health IT has been associated with improvement in some of the quality measures for these conditions. For example, health IT adoption was found to reduce the 60-day mortality for pneumonia and congestive heart failure. [23] Thus, such improvements in pneumonia and heart failure outcomes associated with newly adopted HIT may offset the negative impact of a data breach. AMI is an acute condition that requires timely treatment using accepted guidelines, thus clinicians treating AMI patients may see less benefit from improvements in HIT. If adopting HIT offers little improvement to AMI mortality, such null relationship helps our estimates to isolate the negative impact of a data breach on AMI mortality due to subsequent changes in HIT and patient care processes. We conjectured that AMI mortality would be the most sensitive to data breach among the three conditions. Preliminary analysis showed that breaches were correlated with the AMI mortality rate.
AMI is an acute event, in which a hospitalized patient's outcome depends on the quality of inpatient care. [24] Also, acute medical events are less prone to selection bias due to patient choice, which reduces the possibility of patients avoiding service at a hospital known to have poor quality or one that had been breached. Hospital data breaches were associated with lower number of outpatient visits and admissions in the long-run, which suggests that patients may avoid hospitals involved in a data breach [25] . Thus we chose AMI as our focus for the DID analysis.
D i is a treatment dummy, which is set to 1 if hospital was breached. If a hospital was breached in multiple years, only the first year was coded as breached and the subsequent years were coded as not breached. Thirty eight of the 2,619 hospitals were breached in multiple years. This specification assumes that a breach is a one-time event, which is true for most but not all hospitals in the data. For simplicity, this specification ignores multiple breaches, which may be correlated with the severity of the information problem. at the far ends are imprecise due to smaller sample size, and using them as the reference category will make it harder to detect significant differences.
We modified the specification from Jacobson et al [21] because our treatment-event-time is different for every hospital. Also, observations in the control group do not have a time-to-event dummy; instead they were coded as a time-invariant "never breached" dummy, which was omitted from the fixed effects estimation. This specification is equivalent to combining the never-breached observations with the omitted n = −1 category instead of giving them their own dummy.
Coefficient π n tests the pre-breach trend between the breached hospitals and the never breached hospitals. Prior to the event, the breached hospitals and the control hospital are expected to have parallel trends thus π n should not significantly diverge from 0. We assumed the effect of a breach (at n years since the event) is the same regardless of what year the breach occurred.
α i is the hospital fixed effects. year t is the year fixed effects. An organization's safety culture captures the knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes regarding safety in the organization. [26] Safety and security are rooted in cultures that emphasize the importance of well-designed processes and heightened awareness of goals. We suggest that patient safety and data security cultures are closely related. The overall hospital safety climate, influenced by organizational policy regarding safety, has been associated with readmissions for AMI and heart failure. [24, 27] Hospital fixed effects control for the unobserved time-invariant hospital safety culture.
The DID models was estimated using a fixed effects regression where the hospital effect is removed using the within transformation. The within transformation also removes the time-invariant regressors, such as the treatment dummy D, and they cannot be separately identified. relative time from breach(n=0) mean 30 day mortality rate AMI (%) Figure 2 : Relative time from breach(n=0) vs mean 30-day AMI mortality rate for the subset of hospitals that had been breached Figure 2 shows the 30-day AMI mortality rate over the time from breach, for the breached hospital-year observations. The 30-day AMI mortality rate is decreasing, but the flat trend around the year of the breach suggests a change in slope associated with the breach.
Results
Descriptive statistics
In figure 3 , never-breached hospitals were assigned to a randomly selected breach year, then each hospital-year observation was assigned a pseudo-relative time. The mean 30-day AMI mortality rate of the breached and non-breached hospital-year observations were plotted on the same relative-time x-axis. The breached and non-breached followed a similar decreasing trend, except for the higher mortality rate among the breached hospital-year observations during the first and second years after a breach. to assign the hospitals that were never breached into a pre-or post-event category based on time. Therefore, the never-breached hospital-year observations were pooled into a single control group. This is a limitation to the comparability of the time-varying characteristics between the never-breached group and the pre-breach group in Table 3 .
The control group and the pre-breach group had similar distributions for the 30-day AMI mortality rate. The mean 30-day AMI mortality rate for the pre-breach group was 15.2%; for the control group it was 15.1%.
The mean number of beds for the pre-breach group was nearly two times larger than the control group (469.7 versus 250.4). Among the breached group, the number of beds was higher in the post-breach group.
The proportion of hospital-year observations that reported being a meaningful user of electronic health records (HITECH) for that year varied across the control (64.0%), pre-(41.0%), and post-breach (75.8%) groups. The variation was due to the differences in the distribution of observations by year for each group. Cross-tabulating the percentage of meaningful users by group and year showed that the overall percentage grew from 13% in 2011 to 94% by 2014, and that each group followed a similar time trend.
The proportions of not-for-profit hospitals were similar between the control group and the breached group. However, the breached group had a higher proportion of public hospitals, while the control group had a higher proportion of for-profit hospitals. The breached group was more likely to be major teaching hospitals. Patient satisfaction measures were similar between the control group and the breached group, and satisfaction within the breached group did not vary between the pre-and post-breach group.
Estimates
Multivariate regression estimates indicate that a data breach was associated with a 0. (Table   4 ). 30-day AMI mortality rate of breached hospitals did not differ significantly from the never-breached hospitals in the pre-breach periods. Estimation results that are shown in Table 4 are plotted in Figure 3 . The y-intercept is the results from the reference model. We conclude that our model findings are robust to hospital differences in overall care quality.
Discussion
We find that hospital data breaches were associated with higher 30-day AMI mortality rates in the years following the breach. Changes in HIT and patient care processes in response to a data breach introduce usability challenges and unintended side effects that frustrate clinicians and disrupt patient care. [32] Frustrated clinicians bypassing the new system and process with ad hoc workarounds creates new opportunities for errors. [33, 34] Enhanced security measures in response to a data breach are likely to worsen the usability of the HIT system, which would not only diminish the effectiveness of its intended function but also spawn new errors that worsen the quality of care provided to patients.
We observed that the elevated mortality rates persisted for three years subsequent to a breach.
We believe that the impact of a breach is likely shorter than three years as hospitals tend to implement new procedures, processes, and technologies in the first year following a breach.
Thus we expect the impact of the breach would dissipate over time -possibly less than two years. We note that the data generating process for mortality rates may contribute to the three-year observed impact. Hospital Compare Data measure 30-day mortality as a 36-month moving average, which would smooth the observed response to a breach. The higher mortality rate at three years after the breach suggests this smoothing may be extending the observed time-impact.
More recently, the emergence of hospital ransomware attacks have disrupted hospital services and there are growing fears of attacks on the care delivery system itself. [35] Ransomware attacks are considered to be more disruptive to hospital operations than the breaches considered in this study. The data breaches studied in our analysis come from 2011-2015 when such ransomware or infrastructure attacks were rare. If disruption to information technology used by providers is driving the breach effect, the findings from our study suggest that ransomware attacks may have an even stronger negative impact on patients than the breaches studied in this paper.
Time varying care quality problems are potential confounders to estimating the breach impact on patient outcomes. Controlling for patient safety indicators attempted to address this concern. The breach impact estimates were similar between the models with and without the patient safety indicators. The findings suggest that patient safety indicators were not confounding factors, but raises new concerns whether these indicators were effective controls for care quality problems.
Health data breaches have significant consequences for patients, providers, and payers, which could be framed as a quality of care problem. Protecting health information should be an important responsibility of all parties in the healthcare industry. Our results indicate that breaches and the subsequent hospital reaction may adversely impact care quality. We suggest that breached hospitals should carefully consider subsequent security initiatives to reduce the potential impact of new processes, procedures, and technologies on care quality. The healthcare community must work together to jointly address the need to protect patient data and improve patient outcomes.
